Next was the D-8, but contrary to the story that Dyrenkov himself quickly made an armored car to show to high authorities, he, in fact received the task of developing an armored reconnaissance vehicle using the chassis of a Ford-A passenger car. The Ford A was chosen because this car could no longer be considered completely imported. At the beginning of 1931, there was already an agreement with Henry Ford to build a full-fledged plant in Nizhny Novgorod to produce Ford A cars and Ford AA trucks. But before that, deliveries of vehicle kits had begun. In total, from 1929 to 1932, 3804 of these cars were assembled in Nizhny Novgorod, Kharkov and Moscow. “Armored Ford A,” as Dyrenkov’s armored car was called in correspondence, began to be designed in the fall of 1930, the project was ready in December 1930, and by February 1931, two prototypes were made in two versions – D8R with 2 machine guns and 4 ball mounts, as well as D12R, with an extended body and an anti-aircraft mount. There is a well known story about plywood sheets used as armor. It seems very likely that Dyrenkov, not having the required number of specialised workers, actually used patterns in the form of plywood sheets. The armored car caused a lot of dissatisfied comments from the UMM KA after testing, the 4×2 drive was insufficient and provided poor off-road drive, crew visibility was limited, and the four machine gun ports were rather cumbersome and difficult to use. Despite this, UMM KA gave the go-ahead for the production of D-8 and D-12. The decision to put it into production probably lay in the fact that the D-8 had a very simple design and was cheap to build. For 1931, the order amounted to 50 vehicles. All the armored cars were produced with holes for the four ball mounts. In fact, photographs of serial armored cars show most often, for practical reasons, plates on the sides. Initially, it was planned to produce the D-8, D-12 at the Izhora plant in Leningrad. But the factory was overloaded with tank production (T-18 and T-26 hulls). Therefore, the production of armored cars was moved to Moscow, to the site of the NKPS Experimental Plant, known since 1933 as “Mozherez” (Moscow Railway Repair Plant). In the summer of 1931, a discussion began about armored vehicles of the second series, but the 1932 order amounted to only 10 armored cars (note that the front doors desing protecting the radiator was changed) thus a total of 60 armored vehicles, no one knows for sure how many of them were D-8 or D-12 (probably 35 D-8 and 25 D-12). In 1932, Dyrenkov’s star set. Such sums were spent on his projects, sometimes wasted, that it was not surprising that his fate later turned out bad. The opinion of the D-8 among the troops was, to put it mildly, low. This armored car was tolerated until the Red Army became saturated with more modern models equipped with a rotating turret like, first of all, the FAI. By 1935, the D-8 began to be removed but not everywhere. In rifle divisions, these armored vehicles were quite considered. The D-8, D-12 fought first during the Soviet-Finnish War where 3 D-8 were left damaged and one captured by the Finns (an armored car from the surrounded 163rd Div), this d-8 was used as a training tank in the Finnish tank school until 1943. 2 D-12s were transferred to Mongolia in 1938. In July 1941, they were listed in the armored brigade. As of April 1, 1941, there were still 46 D-8 and D-12 armored cars in service. Curiously, these armored cars took again a direct part in the battles of 1941. The most famous vehicle fought as part of the 166th Infantry Division and was lost in August 1941 near Lake Shchuchye, Dukhovshchinsky district, Smolensk region and two such armored cars were still in service with the 85th Signal Regiment of the 42nd Army of the Leningrad Front in the summer of 1942. Note that no D-8 armored cars were delivered to Spain as sometimes recalled. 

Description :

At first glance the car seems quite small. A year later, in 1933, on the same Ford-A base, the FAI was created, which, although not a giant, looks clearly larger. In fact, the FAI is 150 mm longer than its predecessor but the difference lies in the best use of the chassis. On the contrary, the D-8 was one of the rare in the world and the first Soviet serial armored car with a welded body. On cars of the second series, the seams were covered with additional corners.  The difference between the D-8 and FAI is especially obvious in terms of armament. The FAI was designed from the start with a turret, while the D-8 followed the path of a “wheeled box”, therefore, the D-8 could fire in a small sector forward and back. To fire from the side installations, the skills of a yogi were required, That’s why most of them were covered. The problem, however, was not only with firing. The crew was cramped everywhere even if there is no inside documentation. The internal layout of the vehicle was clearly made irrationally. Accessing the rear machine gun was quite impossible, so the rear installation looked clearly “just in case.” The car maintenance was also difficult. There was no opening hood but small double hatches on the side to get to the motor. If one want to dismantle it, there is no other way than to remove the armored hull. Moreover, the filler neck of the tank was inside, so filling fuel was very hard. With all its shortcomings, the D-8 was a milestone in the history of russian armored vehicles. It was the first serial Soviet light armored car, and the following were able to benefit from all these errors which could be corrected subsequently.

The D-8 was powered by a 40 HP, four-cylinder Ford A engine. With an empty weight of 1.58 tonnes (full combat weight was 2 tonnes), the D-8 was capable of achieving maximum road speeds of up to 85 km/h. As it did not have all-wheel drive, its off-road performance was quite limited. In this case, its maximum speed dropped to only 30 km/h. Fuel capacity was 40 litters and this provided a maximum operational range of 220 km and a 120 to 180 km off-road. to overcome the overheating problems due to the additional extra weight, Dyrenkov added an armored cowl positioned under the engine compartment. Essentially, it provided a steady flow of air to the engine, despite the front armored louvers being shut. The D-8’s superstructure was made using angled armored plates which were welded together. One noticeable feature of this design was the highly angled rear part of the vehicle. On the front part of the engine compartment, a protective louvered grill was placed. On the engine sides, two two-part hatches were installed. These were used by the crew to gain access to the engine for necessary repairs. The enclosed crew compartment was provided with two doors, one located on each side of the vehicle. These opened to the front to provide the crew with some level of protection when they exited the vehicle’s interior. Each of them had a small vision port.

Originally, there were four machine gun ports, each placed on one of the four sides. Their purpose was to provide the crew with an all-around firing arc. In reality, the gunner had trouble removing the machine gun and traversing it to another firing position. For this reason, most often, the side machine gun ports were removed. Instead of them, simple round shaped (or in some cases square) armored covers were placed. The front machine gun port was protected by a folding armored plate. The rear-positioned port was protected with two round-shaped folding armor plates. A driver-folding vision port was located on the left vehicle side. Lastly, on top of the crew compartment, a hatch was placed. A spare wheel was held on the left side of the superstructure. From the start, engineer Dyrenkov decided to ditch the idea of using a gun-armed turret. He designed his vehicle primarily to fulfill the role of reconnaissance. It was not to engage in offensive actions, instead, its purpose was to gather intelligence on the enemy. If the D-8 had to be used in combat, for the vehicle and crew’s defense, a 7.62 mm DT machine gun was to be used. When the prototype was presented to the Soviet Army, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov insisted that a second machine gun be placed facing the rear of the vehicle. The use of two machine guns inside the cramped interior caused more problems than it was worth, so during operations, only one machine gun was carried. The commander had trouble operating these two, as he had to often change his position, which was not easy to do. The ammunition load consisted of 4,158 rounds of ammunition. Around a third of this ammunition consisted of armor-piercing rounds. Given its lightweight and small size, the D-8 was only lightly protected. The front and side armor plates were 7 mm thick. The top and rear armor were 6 mm and the bottom was only 3 mm thick. The use of angled armor plates provided an additional level of protection. Despite the angled armor, the D-8 was only fully protected against small caliber rounds and fragments. Any kind of dedicated anti-tank weapon could easily take out this vehicle. Another major defensive factor was the vehicle’s relatively small size. It had a length of 3.54 m, a width of 1.7 m, and a height of only 1.68 m. The crew consisted of only two: the commander, who was also the machine gun operator; and the driver. The driver’s position was on the left and the commander was on the right. The commander was quite overburdened with the different tasks that he had to perform. Besides his commanding role, he also had to act as a spotter and take care of the machine gun (firing, changing positions, and loading). This greatly limited his effectiveness in combat situations. Due to the vehicle’s small size, adding one more crew member was not possible. The commander was not provided with a command cupola, instead, he would have to use the top hatch to observe the surroundings. This made him somewhat exposed to potential enemy fire. Despite its basic design being meant for reconnaissance operations, the D-8 was not provided with radio equipment.